REPORTS OF MY DEATH ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED:
A REPLY
AKHIL REED AMAR

It is an honor to have my two-tier thesis examined and operated
upon by two such experienced legal surgeons as Daniel Meltzer and
Martin Redish. Alas, the prognosis, according to these two juris doctors, is none too good. Redish pronounces the thesis virtually dead
on arrival;' Meltzer, though more cautious and less colorful, is in the
end not very encouraging. 2 But, dear reader, do not be fooled. The
two-tier thesis is very much alive (and kicking).
I.

THE QUESTION

It would be rather silly to claim that the two-tier thesis provides
an undeniably perfect interpretive account of all possible data-constitutional text, history, structure, case law, etc. Rather, my claim, in
1985' and now,4 has always been that the thesis, however "problematic" and "imperfect," provides a far better-more plausible, more
coherent, more careful, more sensible, more explanatory, more satisfying-account of article III than any of its interpretive competitors. 5
To meet this claim, Meltzer and Redish need to show that, by the
same standards they apply to my thesis, their own proferred alternatives havefewer holes and more explanatory power. In short, the key
question is comparative. In what follows, I shall try to condense and
summarize the data, avoiding as much repetition as possible. In virtually every category, it will appear that the two-tier thesis is better.
I See Redish, Text, Structure and Common Sense in the Interpretationof Article III, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990).
2 See Meltzer, The Histoy and Structure ofArtice III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569

(1990).
3 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two-Tiers of Federal

Jurisdiction,65 B.U.L. REV. 205 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, A Neo-Federalist View].
4 Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1499 (1990).
5 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 230 n.86; Amar, supra note 4, at
1546.
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THE EVIDENCE

A.

Text

The two-tier thesis pays careful attention to many of article III's
words and phrases-"judicial power," "of the United States,"
"vested," 'judges," "arising under," "admiralty and maritime" and
so on-but places special emphasis on the words "shall" and "all."
Redish and Meltzer both disagree with this emphasis.
1.

Redish

Redish's most colorful claim-that my textual analysis is "internally inconsistent" 6 -rests on a misstatement of my argument. He
claims that because I would allow Congress to remove various second tier controversies from federal courts altogether, I somehow
undercut my argument that the word "shall" in the "shall be vested"
and "shall extend" clauses is mandatory. 7 Redish's claim is a nonsequitur. I simply read article III to require that the judicial power
"shall be vested" in federal courts; and that such power "shall
extend," in either original or appellate form, to "all" cases in the
first tier; and to afew, some, or all, as Congress chooses, "controversies"
in the second tier. In both places, under my theory, "shall" obviously means "shall"-that is, "must." Indeed, precisely because I
take "shall" as strictly mandatory, I have explicitly noted that
"arguably federal courts must have the power to hear some minuscule subset of" each second tier category in order to satisfy the command that "the judicial power shall extend to [at least two]
controversies in each category. '" Yet since "any such restriction on
congressional power would be... trivial," for expository ease it is
easier to speak "as if Congress could abolish all jurisdiction in these
categories."°
To be sure, article III does not literally read the way I have rendered it above. I have interpolated the italicized words afew, some, or
6 Redish, supra note 1, at 1634.
7 See id. at 1639-41.

8 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 240 n. 119 (emphasis added and
insert in original).
9 Id. Despite Redish's attempted sleight of hand, Redish, supra note 1, at 1641
n.29, the "shall be vested" clause does not tell us which cases fall within the judicial
power. For example, must state law cases between co-citizens be vested in federal
courts? The answer to this must come from the "shall extend" clause, which defines
the scope of what must be vested. And as I have explained in the text, this language is
two-tiered.
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all, as Congress chooses in the place of a textual lacuna. But some interpolation is unavoidable. In his more colorful moments, Redish
seems to argue that anyone who takes the text seriously must somehow interpolate "all" here.' ° But there is an obvious problem with
that approach, as Redish himself recognizes sotto voce: to interpolate
"all" seems to do violence to the carefully selective use of "all" in article III. (Put another way, to a formalist like Redish, automatic interpolation of "all" seems to violate the maxim of expressio unius.)
This point is at the very heart of my textual argument, yet Redish contents himself with a single and breezy footnote on the problem." Apart from reiterating his willingness to interpolate "all"which does not avoid the textual problem, and requires him to presume that the selective use of "all" is meaningless (a presumption
contrary to first principles of faithful textual interpretation)-Redish
suggests that the Constitution itself provides for an unspecified, but
nevertheless fixed amount (short of "all") of jurisdiction in second
tier controversies. I, on the other hand, argue that precisely because
the Constitution does not specify this amount, in sharp contradistinction to the word "all" in the first tier, the Constitution gives Congress the power to decide how little or how much second tier
jurisdiction to vest. My argument is carefully grounded in the precise language of the necessary and proper clause,' 2 in the interplay
between that clause and the language of article 111,3 and in the plain
language of the leading Supreme Court case on the issue, Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 4 where the Taney Court explicitly rejected a
Redish-like argument of counsel at oral argument in favor of my necessary and proper clause approach.' 5 Because Redish neither mentions nor addresses any of this, his argument never gets off the
ground. My argument here also rests in large part on dramatic evi10 See Redish, supra note 1, at 1639-41.
11 See id at 1640 n.28.

12 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 229-30, 254-55 n.160; Amar,
Marbury, Section 13, and the OriginalJurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. Rv.
443, 480-83 (1989) [hereinafter Amar, Section 13].
13 See Amar, Section 13, supra note 12, at 481-83 & nn.176-84.

14 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
15 See id. at 672-73 (Redish-like claim at oral argument); id. at 721 (Court
rejection in favor of my approach, explicitly invoking necessary and proper clause).
For full quotations and more discussion, see Amar, Section 13, supra note 12, at 48485. Professor Meltzer's account of this case fails to capture the meaning of this
exchange, and thus misses the case's significance. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1628
n.228. Here, as elsewhere, the interested reader would do well to consult my initial
formulation. See Amar, Section 13, supra note 12, at 481-85.
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dence from the Philadelphia Convention, which, as we shall see
below, 6 Redish ignores.
Despite his lapses and inaccuracies, Redish does make one serious textual point: the language of article III is considerably more
awkward in expressing the meaning I attribute to it than alternative
language would be. For example, it would have been far clearer for
the framers to have explicitly interposed the italicized phrase I interpolated before the word "controversies." Thus while Redish errs in
claiming that my reading is "internally inconsistent," he does correctly identify the reading's awkwardness. But as with much else,
awkwardness is a comparative concept. Is it not more awkward to presume that the two-tiered language has no meaning-even when, as
we shall see below, that language is buttressed by powerful historical
and structural arguments?
What's more, if the framers had truly intended for Congress to
have the kind of plenary jurisdiction stripping power that Redish
claims, the language they chose is even more awkward. Whereas my
reading fills in an interpretive gap where some implicit gap-filling is
unavoidable, Redish's reading rewrites article III from start to finish.
Redish himself unwittingly dramatizes this point himself by drafting
language that looks profoundly different from article III: "All of the
judicial power, including tile authority to interpret and enforce this
constitution, shall be vested in the judiciary, except the legislature
may make exceptions to or impose limitations on that authority, as it
so desires." 7 Unlike the words of this passage, article III's commands that the judicial power "shall be vested" in federal courts and
"shall extend to all cases" in certain categories are not expressly limited by the exceptions clause. Only the Supreme Court's appellatejuridiction, not the judicialpower of he United States, is so limited. Redish must
thus twist the exceptions language into an implied repeal of unambiguous prior commands. "Thisis surely awkward, not to mention in
violation of standard interpretive canons disfavoring repeals by
implication. 18
16

See infra text accompanying notes 34-47.

17 Redish, supra note 1, at 1635.

18 Elsewhere, Redish again argues for repeal by implication by suggesting that
the due process clause radically altered congressional power under article III to oust
state court federal question jurisdiction, id. at 1648 n.54, while citing no history to

show that the due process framers thought they were in any way changing article III's
allocational rules. Redish's newly-voiced position stands in sharp contrast to the
"traditional" Hart position that due process principles requiring that at least state
courts be open to hear federal claims were implicit in article III. Although I have in
the past criticized Hart's precise formulation, see Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra
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Put another way, if bifurcation is rejected, and "all" is interpolated before "controversies" in the second tier, the obviously best
reading would not be Redish's unitary permissive thesis, but Professor Clinton's unitary mandatory approach (which Redish does not
even mention, much less engage). 19 Under Clinton's approach, precisely because "shall" means "shall" and is not explicitly qualified-by
the exceptions clause, all nine jurisdictional categories would have to
be vested, at least on appeal, in federal courts. The "exceptions"
clause would operate only to allow Congress to shift Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction to some other federal court. Redish fails to
grasp that the two-tiered reading actually gives Congress more power
than it would have under the most plausible unitary approach (many
of whose textual, structural and historical foundations also support
the two-tier approach).
Again: if, as Redish concedes, the language of the exceptions
clause does not modify the "shall" in the clause setting out the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, how can it modify the
mandatory character of the "shall be vested" and "shall extend"
clauses? If, as Redish has explicitly argued in the past,2 0 the Court's
original jurisdiction cannot be modified because "shall" means
"must" in the "shall be vested" and "shall have original jurisdiction"
clauses, why is the same not true of the "shall extend to all cases"
mandate? Redish never engages these questions, which I explicitly
posed in both of the essays he now dismisses 2 (and in a third he
disregards).2 2 It is of course also revealing that Redish's rewriting of
article III conveniently sidesteps the original jurisdiction issue.
note 3, at 226 n.81, in retrospect Hart's view seems much more plausible than
Redish's clause-bound and a-structural approach. Contrary to Redish's intimations,
the framers of the Bill of Rights explicitly stated that many of their amendments did
not alter existing constitutional rules, but simply declared and clarified them. See, e.g.,
U.S. CONsT. amend. X; 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONsTrrrrIoN 321 (G.P.O.
1901) (congressional resolution accompanying Bill of Rights describing them as
"declaratory" as well as "restrictive").
19 See generally, Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984). For
more discussion of this thesis, see Amar, supra note 4, at 1506-08, 1519-22, 1534-35,
1549-53, 1564.
20 See Amar, supra note 4, at 1522-24 and sources cited therein.
21 Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 3, at 239 n. 118; Amar, supra note 4, at
1522-25.
22 Amar, Section 13, supra note 12, at 487. While the present essay was in press,
Professor Redish did add a brief discussion of the original jurisdiction issue. See
Redish, supra note 1, at 1637 n.24. I, of course, agree that the purpose of an
"exception" is to qualify a rule-but the question is, which rule? Plainly, the words of
the exceptions clause qualify the otherwise mandatory command that the Supreme
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In the end, the reader is entitled to ask of Redish, "Whose Constitution are you talking about, Utopia's or ours?" 2 But Redish is
not content simply to rewrite article III. He also insists on rewriting
my theory, knocking down straw arguments I never made, and never
addressing the serious ones I did. He does make one good point"Had the framers intended the result urged by Professor Amar, they
could have said so" more clearly 2 4 -but as a comparative matter, the

point proves too much, for the same of course is true for every other
reading of article III, especially Redish's.
2.

Meltzer

Professor Meltzer's essay is far more careful (if less colorful), but
in the end no more satisfying in its textual exegesis. Meltzer recognizes that any claim that article III's two-tiered language is meaningless is unattractive, so he attempts to come up with a counterthesis
that focuses attention on the fact that in the first tier article III uses
the word "cases," but in the second, "controversies" (a fact I also
explicitly noted and discussed in 1985).25 Meltzer argues that
"cases" encompass both criminal and civil disputes, but "controversies" only the latter.2 6 There are three big problems here. First, as
we shall see below, there is very little historical support for this
claim. If the issue is a comparative one, there is far less support for
Meltzer's thesis than for mine in the Philadelphia Convention
records, in the ratification debates, in the text and legislative history
of the Judiciary Acts of 1789 and 1801, and in early Supreme Court
case law. Meltzer's apparent willingness to sign onto the civil/criminal distinction, but not the mandatory/permissive one is emblematic
of a subtle but pervasive double standard that runs throughout his
essay. (And speaking of double standards, I cannot resist making
the "perhaps too easy" 2 7 point that if the term "controversies" simCourt "shall have appellate jurisdiction" in "all" non-original cases-thus illustrating

that "shall" and "all" are here again used in their plain meaning sense. See Amar, A
Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 239 n. 118, 242. The words of the clause do not,
however, repeal the more global :ommand that "the judicial power shall extend to
all" first tier cases.
23 Cf. Hart, The Power of Congrss to Limit theJurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1372 (1953). I am using "Utopia" here in its
literal sense-i.e. "no place."
24 Redish, supra note 1,at 1637.
25 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 244 n.128 (noting but
discounting interpretation of language as tracking civil/criminal distinction).
26 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1574-76.
27 Cf id. at 1604.
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ply means "civil cases" the framers could have said so with great
ease.)
Second, and more damning, the civil/criminal distinction,
whether or not ultimately persuasive, is wholly irrelevant. So what if
"cases" and "controversies" mean different things? How does that
account for the fact that the judicial power shall extend to "all"
[criminal and civil] cases in the first tier, but not necessarily all [civil]
controversies in the second? To his great credit, Meltzer is candid
enough to admit that his approach renders the selective use of the
word "all" 2 wholly redundant of the case/controversy distinctionredundant, I might add, in a manner awkward enough to make Yogi
Berra wince. Isn't it less strained to follow plain meaning and read
"all" as adding something above and beyond whatever case/controversy distinction may exist? (The Martin Court thought so even without the benefit of various then-unreleased evidence from
Philadelphia that, as we shall see below, strongly supports Martin's
reading.) In the end, Meltzer is willing here to let his own theory
wriggle off the hook far too quickly-"it remains possible that 'all' " is
both awkward and redundant 2 9 -while holding my thesis to a considerably higher standard.
Finally, even if Meltzer were to have a good case against bifurcation, this hardly leads to his own "traditional" unitary permissive
thesis rather than Professor Clinton's unitary mandatory approach.
Under Meltzer's view, why is there no requirement that federal
courts have the last word in all first tier cases, criminal and civil, and
all civil cases in the second tier? Meltzer says that "one can easily
read... 'shall be vested'" to mean "may (rather than must),"' but
this slide from the text's plain meaning is "easy" only if one blithely
ignores the vast bulk of historical and structural arguments that both
Clinton and I make."1 So too with Meltzer's reading of "shall
extend"-which runs contrary to the great weight of federalist argument featured in my work and Clinton's. (Meltzer's support consists
of self-serving and conclusory statements by a single rather obscure
anti-federalist in the first Congress. 2 Here too, a double standard
seems to apply.) Nor can Meltzer draw much comfort from the
See id. at 1575.
Id. (emphasis added); cf. id. at 1573 n.14 (similar formulation).
30 Id. at 1596-97; see also id. at 1573 n.14.
31 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 4, at 1525 n.80 (citing sources). See generally
Clinton, supra note 19.
32 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1573-74 nn.14-15 (quoting Michael Jenifer
Stone).
28
29
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exceptions clause for, as we have seen, the clause in no way repeals
the "shall be vested" and "shall extend" mandates. Indeed, Meltzer
himself candidly admits (in sharp contrast to Redish) that there is
little evidence from Philadelphia enabling the tiny clause to bear all
the weight "traditionalists" heap upon it. 3 3 (Under both Clinton's
approach and my own, the clause of course needs to bear far less
weight for it only authorizes shifting federal question and admiralty
among article III officers.)
B.

History

1. The Philadelphia Convention
To fully know a text, one must understand its context. The
immediate context generating the two-tiered text of article III was of
course the Philadelphia Convention-in particular its five man Committee of Detail, appointed to integrate the Convention's resolutions
into a full working draft Constitution. It is in this Committee that the
two-tiered text of article III took shape. The two-tier thesis draws
support from myriad bits of evidence from Philadelphia, but focuses
especially on four items:
*1. After considerable preliminary discussion, the Convention
ultimately adopted as its final charge to the Committee of Detail a
resolution proposed by Madison: "the jurisdiction [of the national
judiciary] shall extend to all cases arising under the Natl. laws: And
to such other questions as may involve the Natl. peace &
34
harmony."
*2. The first major Committee of Detail draft, composed by
Edmund Randolph with emendations by John Rutledge (indicated in
brackets) fleshed out the Convention's resolution as follows:
The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1. to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general
[Legislature]
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases as the national legislature may assign, as
involving the national peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between citizens of different states
33
34

See id. at 1610.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 46 (M. Farrand ed.
1937). The resolution's wording is taken from the notes of its sponsor, James
Madison.
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[in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of another
State]
in disputes between different states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are
concerned
35
[& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn]
*3. The next major draft of the Committee, in James Wilson's
hand, preserved the basic two-tiered structure of its predecessor, but
did so through the selective use of the word "all." This draft bears a
striking resemblance to the ultimate Committee report, and in turn,
the eventual language of article III:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court shall extend
to all Cases arising under Laws passed by the Legislature of the
United States; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors (and other)
[other] public Ministers [& Consuls], to the Trial of Impeachments
of Officers of the United States; to all Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies between [States-except those
wh. regard Jurisdn or Territory,-betwn] a State and a Citizen or
Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States and
between [a State or the] Citizens (of3any
of the States) [thereof] and
6
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
*4. After adopting (with minor modifications) the Committee of
Detail's language, the Convention carefully modified the clause setting out the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, adding the single
word "all" before ambassador cases, but not state party cases,
thereby bringing the clause into strict conformity with the selective
7
use of "all" in the jurisdictional menu.
On the basis of all this (and other evidence from Philadelphia), I
presented in 1985 the following (hi)story: 8 Madison's final Convention resolution (* 1) strongly anticipated a two-tier approach, in singling out, and giving literal primacy to, arising under jurisdiction
(the coextensiveness principle) and in strongly hinting that jurisdiction must ("shall") extend to all arising under cases, but not necessarily "all" cases in other categories ("such questions as may . . .").
The Committee of Detail tried to implement this rather broad resolution by enumerating specific categories of judicial power, just as
-5 Id. at 14647.
36 Id at 172-73 (inserts in original).
37 Compare id. at 576 (Committee of Style draft) with id. at 661 (final draft).
38 See, e.g., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 242-45. For a brief
discussion of the impeachment issue flagged by Meltzer, see Meltzer, supra note 2, at
1580 n.35, see Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 244 n.128.
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they tried to enumerate specific categories of legislative power in
language that would eventually become article I, section 8. They
obviously read Madison's resolution (*1) as two-tiered, for in their
first draft (*2) they required that jurisdiction "shall extend" to "all"
proto-arising under cases, but only to "such other cases as the legislature may assign" in other areas. In the second tier, we see obvious
prototypes of the second tier, party-defined "controversies" of the
final version of article III. As is often true of first drafts, there were
some glaring omissions; when Rutledge remembered admiralty,
whose significance and appropriateness were almost universally recognized, he scribbled language on the bottom of the page, without
integrating it into the carefully two-tiered structure. The task of integration fell to James Wilson, whose Committee draft (*3) preserved
the plainly two-tiered structure of its predecessor (*2) through the
selective use of the word "all." There is of course a striking correspondence between, on the one hand, Wilson's first tier ("shall
extend to all cases") and the explicitly mandatory language (ditto) in
the Randolph-Rutledge draft; and on the other, between the categories in Wilson's second tier ("controversies" not preceded by "all")
and those in the explicitly permissive tier ("such other cases as the
legislature may assign") in the earlier draft. To be sure, Wilson did
some substantive rearranging-he folded admiralty into the first
(mandatory) tier, and added ambassador cases, apparently in an
effort to integrate certain aspects of a plan authored by William Paterson, which he also had before him. Nevertheless, to juxtapose the
two Committee drafts (*2 and *3) is to see dramatic evidence that
the selective use of the word "all'" was introduced to preserve (if
somewhat awkwardly) the plain distinction between mandatory and
permissive tiers. The Convention adopted this two-tiered language,
and later showed its appreciation of this key word by selectively
adding it to the original jurisdiction clause so as to render it in painstaking conformity with the two-tiered language of the jurisdictional
menu (*4).
How do Meltzer and Redish deal with all of this? Redish simply
ignores it, and (after thus shielding it from view) proclaims my thesis
"wholly result-oriented [and] unsupported," "totally devoid of
meaningful historical suppor:," "complete[ly]" lacking any "contemporaneous" historical evidence, and "at odds with ... the intent of
those who drafted" article III. 3 9 This may make for fun prose, but as
serious scholarship, it just will not do.
39

Redish, supra note 1, at 163.4, 1636, 1643, 1649.
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Meltzer's approach is more careful but in the end not much
more convincing. He quotes only * 1 and *2 and fleetingly mentions
*3 and *4, but treats each bit in isolation. Thus, he argues that, taken
alone, Madison's resolution is thin evidence of bifurcation. 40 But
when juxtaposed with the Randolph-Rutledge draft-which Meltzer
tucks away in a footnote three pages later4 '-Madison's resolution
looks rather different, and quite dramatic. Look again at how the
draft carefully invokes Madison's language in its explicitly two-tiered
structure. In the mandatory tier, jurisdiction "shall extend to all cases
arisingunder" national laws, but in the permissive tier, only to "such
other cases, as... may... involv[e] the nationalpeace and harmony."
Meltzer's minimization of this draft also obscures the otherwise
obvious fact that, contrary to his "easy" assertions, the framers used
"shall extend" in a mandatory sense: "shall" means "shall," not
"may," and "extend" means just that, not "have the capability [if
Congress chooses]" as Meltzer suggests. Other evidence from Philadelphia, both before and after the Randolph-Rutledge draft, only
confirms this point.4 2

Meltzer of course also nowhere juxtaposes the undeniably twotiered Randolph-Rutledge draft (*2) with Wilson's draft (*3), where
the selective use of "all" made its first appearance in Committee; nor
does he concentrate on the subsequent history of "all" in the Convention (*4). But taken as a whole (rather than in a divide-and-conquer fashion), items * 1-*4 seem to me rather powerful evidence for
my reading of the selective use of "all." It is thus odd to see Meltzer
stress that "The short of the matter is that Amar has not identified
any speech at the Convention ...debates that articulated a distinction between mandatory and permissive jurisdictions. 4 3
See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1577-78.
See id. at 1580 n.35.
42 See supra note 31 and sources cited therein. Meltzer nowhere addresses this
evidence.
43 Meltzer, supra note 2,at 1578-79. Even if technically true, Meltzer's statement
is misleading, especially because he only selectively presents the (hi)story I offered.
But the statement is problematic in even its narrowest sense. Members of the
Committee of Detail surely were participants at Philadelphia; surely they discussed
and debated things, in Committee and beyond; and surely the drafts I identified are
evidence of views they articulated. Now, drafts are not verbatim transcripts of speeches,
but neither are Madison's notes. As the key language of article III was forged in this
Committee, items *2 and *3 are very substantial evidence indeed, and all the more so
because Madison's notes preserve little evidence of whatever subsequent Convention
discussion may have occurred. Here, as elsewhere, it is dangerous to draw strong
inferences from "silence" alone, as do both Meltzer and Redish. The "record" is
"silent" on many issues because Madison's notes are profoundly incomplete. See
40
41
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Meltzer further complicates matters by introducing lots of extraneous items-from drafts that played at best bit parts at Philadelphia
(and appear to have had little or no impact on the Committee of
Detail), from early discussions that occured before principles and
priorities were identified arid refined, and so on.4 4 What results is a
rather open and indeterminate narrative. If Meltzer's aim is simply
to show that everything was and is up for grabs, this is, of course, a
clever strategy.
But I take it this is not Meltzer's position. He knows that he
must show why my account is less plausible than the "traditionalists'."4 5 Thus, in critiquing my view, he would have done well to set
out the (hi)story as I set it out, and show why I'm wrong. But even if
he did this (which he didn't), he would then need to present an
affirmative focussed counternarrative that shows that the "traditional" reading is more consistent with the data. Where, for example, is the evidence that the framers believed that politically
dependent state courts could sit as the last word in arising under and
admiralty cases? 4 6 Or that ithese cases were less important than, say,
ambassador and state-party cases (and thus subject to jurisdiction
stripping in a way that the tatter are not, according to "traditionalists")? Or that the key (and sole) distinction between the two tiers is
the civil/criminal distinction? And so on.
If the game is comparative, here's how I score Philadelphia. (1)
I claim "shall extend" is maadatory; Meltzer denies it. The evidence
plainly supports my reading and Meltzer offers no evidence. (2) I
claim that federal question and admiralty jurisdiction were of primary importance; Meltzer concedes the first, and himself provides
considerable evidence for the second-but seems to deny the constitutional significance of both concessions. Meltzer quotes fragments
suggesting that some delegates viewed state party controversies as
important but points to no solid evidence that the Convention generally viewed these disputes as more important than--or even as on a
par with-federal question and admiralty cases. By contrast, items
*1-*4 all downplay state party cases and stress the first tier, especially "arising under" cases. (3) I claim that the word "all" is signifiHutson, The Creationof the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEx. L.
REV. 1 (1986).
44 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1577, 1580, 1582.
45 See id. at 1623.
46 In fact, a leading source on whom Meltzer relies explicitly concedes that the
historical evidence from Philadelphia runs the other way. See infra text accompanying
note 90.

1990]

REPORTS OF MY DEATH: A REPLY

1663

cant as a trigger between mandatory and permissive tiers; Meltzer
disagrees. Items * 1-*4 strongly support my view, and Meltzer offers
no affirmative evidence from any major draft or discussion that the
selective use meant something different or nothing at all. (4) Meltzer claims that first tier "cases" are distinct from "controversies" in
the second tier because the latter comprise only civil disputes; I claim
this distinction lacks much historical support, and in any event is
irrelevant. Meltzer offers absolutely no historical support for his distinction, whereas juxtaposition of Committee drafts *2 and *3
strongly supports my view that the key distinction between the two
tiers is the mandatory/permissive distinction.
One final note about Philadelphia. There is more-far morePhiladelphia support for my ideas (structural superiority, true parity,
political safeguards, and so on) than I have been able to highlight
here. There is simply not enough space to re-present everything
here, and to show how much Meltzer and Redish omit. What I hope
I have shown is that their accounts of Philadelphia, and their reports
of my own Philadelphia evidence (or lack thereof) are, well ...
exaggerated.
2.

Ratification Debates

During the ratification debates, although federal admiralty was
uncontroversial and federalists forcefully argued for plenary arising
under jurisdiction, "no part of the Federal jurisdiction.., sustained
so strong an attack from the Anti-Federalists, or... received so weak
a defense from the Federalists as diversity jurisdiction., 47 In Pennsylvania, James Wilson, the author of the two-tiered text, delivered
an influential defense of article III in which he carefully observed its
two-tiered language even as he paraphrased other portions of article
H".48 Meltzer and Redish point to no affirmative evidence that anyone during ratification thought that the selective use of "all" meant
something different (or nothing at all), and what they do cite is a
mixed bag. First, Meltzer invokes anti-federalists who attacked federal question jurisdiction, but doesn't cite a single leading federalist
who agreed.4 9 My theory, of course, sought to interpret article III
from the perspective of federalists5" who wrote, understood, and
47 Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 81-82 (1923); see also Amar, supra note 4, at 1508 n.23 (citing sources).

48 See Amar, supra note 4, at 1545 n.169 (citing sources).
49 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1583-84.
50 This should be obvious from the title of my 1985 essay. However,
notwithstanding Redish's color commentary to the contrary, I did not, in a
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defended it, rather than those whose views were rejected in Philadelphia and the ratifying debates. Meltzer also cites various federalists
(including Hamilton in The FederalistNo. 80)"' who seemed to lump
together all nine categories, but as Robert Clinton has shown, 5 2 their
statements generally argue not for Meltzer's view, but for the unitary
mandatory thesis. Once again, my critics' biggest point is that there is
not much affirmative evidence here supporting the two-tier thesis,
but once again, as a comparative point, the same is true for them.
There is simply not a lot of evidence either way, because the jurisdiction-stripping issue did not receive careful and sustained attention.
Silence alone does not argue one way or another.
Although I have little analytic stake in quibbling over Meltzer's
civil/criminal distinction (since, even if correct, it is basically irrelevant), I note that Meltzer cites only a single source (from an antifederalist who was not at Philadelphia),5" and even that source is at
best suggestive.5 4 Once again, a double standard is at work.
3.

The.Judiciary Act of 1789

The First Judiciary Act is discussed at length in the preceding
essays, so the evidence can be quickly summed up. Although various
holes in ambassadorjurisdiction are equally inconsistent with all theories of article III, certain possible holes in state party cases are concededly "problematic" 5 5 for "traditionalists" but not for the two
tier-thesis. 5 6 Since Meltzer seems to concede the strength of my
analysis of the savings clause, the only "hole" left results from possibly underinclusive language in section 25. Meltzer tries to make
"simplistic and superficial" manner "fallaciously view[] the framers as a monolithic
group." Redish, supra note 1, at 1646; see also Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 3,
at 230 n.86.
51 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1580-82.
52 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 19, at 750, 829-37. So too with the work of
Professor Holt, whom Meltzer also cites here.
53 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1575.
54 Far from distinguishing "cases" from "controversies," the very sentence
Meltzer quotes equates these two words. And even if "Agrippa" did believe that
citizen-citizen diversity jurisdiction was civil only, there is nothing here from which to
infer that "Agrippa" thought the same was true for all other "controversy"
categories, but not first tier "cases." Slightly sturdier, but still far from firm support
for Meltzer's distinction comes from a source he does not cite. See I THE DEBATES OF
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUrION,

336 (J.Elliot ed. 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (proposed amendments
accompanying Rhode Island's 1790 ratification of Constitution).
55 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1597 n.96, 1608 n.138.
56 See Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 3,at 254 n. 160; Amar, supra note 4,
at 1523 n.74; Amar, Section 13, supra note 12, at 478-88.
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much-too much-of this, but I don't see a big gap, if any. Meltzer's
analysis places great weight on the limiting language of section 25,
but I too, account for this language.5 7 In any event, even if section
25 was underinclusive, it was so in a way that reflected a quite plausible congressional reading of article III's "arising under" mandate."
In the double standard department, Meltzer's own case/controversy theory is far more difficult to square with the plain words of the
Act. Section 12 speaks clearly of "any action" but Meltzer after noting these words argues that they don't mean what they say-only civil
actions were covered.5 9 But in every other place where the Act
intended to limit jurisdiction to "civil" cases it used the word
"civil." 6 ° And nowhere in the Act's legislative history does Meltzer
identify any hint of his suggested civil/criminal distinction. Nor does
Meltzer or Redish invoke any other affirmative evidence that the
members of the first Congress believed the selective use of the word
"all" was meaningless. Although the legislative history I presented
is not overwhelming, as a comparative matter; it seems far more solid
than its alternatives.
4. The Judiciary Act of 1801
As the federalists had far more control over the Act of 1801 than
its 1789 predecessor, the later Act may furnish a better vista onto the
Federalist Constitution of 1787. The Act's text and structure could
hardly be more explicitly two-tiered, 6 and the legislative history features Abraham Nott's very clear statements about the selective use of
the word "all." 6 2 Redish and Meltzer offer no evidence whatsoever
here.
See Amar, supra note 4, at 1530 n.101, 1539-40.
See id. at 1529.
59 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1576 n.23. Meltzer's arguments for this reading
are not implausible. But if we have to choose between the civil/criminal and the
mandatory/permissive distinctions, Meltzer's arguments here are ess plausible than
those I offer for my reading of "arising under" and § 25. See Amar, supra note 4, at
1529-33; cf infra text accompanying note 60. (In fact, of course, we need not choose
only one, since my two-tier thesis can easily accommodate the view that article III also
contains a civil/criminal distinction.)
60 See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 ("civil cases"); id. § 11
("suits of a civil nature"); id § 17 ("controversies of a civil nature"). Note also that
the Act seems to use the words "causes" (i.e., "cases") and "controversies"
indiscriminately.
61 See Amar, supra note 4, at 1534 n.1 14.
62 See id. at 1550-51.
57
58
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Early Case Law and Commentary

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,' 6 3 of course, supports the two-tier thesis

far more than it does the "traditional" account. Later classic Marshall Court opinions and at least one early Taney Court decision
echo Martin's two-tiered approach.' To be sure, these echoes are
not as resounding as Martin itself 6 5 -but why should they be, given
that the Court had already spoken? Three basic points remain.
First, all these cases explicitly bifurcate article III into the same two
tiers Story identified in Martin. Second, none of them in any way
criticizes or challenges Story's "easy" answer 6 6 that the two tiers correspond to mandatory and permissive jurisdiction, respectively.
Third, as a comparative matter, none of these cases remotely suggests that the only-or even a key-distinction between the tiers is
Meltzer's civil/criminal distinction.
Distinguished extra-judicial commentary-from Marshall, Story,
Kent and Buchanan 67-offers even more powerful evidence. The
last three sources invoke Martin by name and strongly underscore
(often literally) its emphasis on the selective words "all cases." Meltzer does not discuss the forceful words of Kent and Buchanan, but
he does try to downplay Story's and Marshall's comments. Judge for
yourself:
Story:
[I]t is clear, from the language of the constitution, that, in one form
or the other [i.e., original or appellate], it is absolutely obligatory
upon Congress to vest all the jurisdiction in the national courts, in
63 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

See Amar, supra note 4, at 1513 n.3 7 (citing sources). By contrast, Meltzer can
point only to a lone dissent in 1793 in support of his own civil/criminal distinction.
See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1575 n.20.
65 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1628 n.228. But see Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821-22 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (labelling first tier
"most important class").
66 See Amar, supra note 4, at 1502.
67 See id. at 1513-14.
In this category, as elsewhere, there is ess support for Meltzer's civil/criminal
distinction. His main support comes from St. George Tucker, an anti-federalist
whose son was in fact losing counsel in Martin, where he took the extreme position
that Congress had no power to provide for Supreme Court review of state court
federal question cases. Although these views may be severable from the issue at
hand, they nevertheless cast doubt on the Tuckers' general reliability on issues of
judicial federalism. See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1575 n. 18.
64
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that class of cases
at least, where it has declared, that it shall extend
68
to "all cases."
Marshall:
[Arising under cases] stood first in the minds of the framers ....
The jurisdiction is expressly given [to federal courts] in the words
"the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under this
constitution."
...[T]he

words are "all cases" and I deny that the word "some"
can be substituted for "all," or that the word "all," can be satisfied
if any 9one case can be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the
court.

6

Consider the following dialogue:
Meltzer: Professor Gunther notes that in their correspondence
neither Story nor Marshall suggested that repeal of section 25 would
be unconstitutional. 7 °
Amar: Of course it wouldn't if some other federal court review of
state court federal question jurisdiction were substituted. But both
of these passages seem clearly to require at least some federal court,
no?
Meltzer: Story's passage, as you concede, is equivocal.7 1
Amar: Not whether at least first tier cases are mandatory. If
there's any equivocation, it's between my theory and Clinton's even
broader mandatory thesis. But you reject both, so any equivocation
here-and I see less than you-is in any event wholly at odds with
your "Tradition." Besides, what about Marshall?
Meltzer: He merely sought to establish that Congress could, but
72
need not, give federal courts federal question jurisdiction.
68

3 J.STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrurION OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 1696 (1833).
69 Marshall, A Friendof the Constitution, inJoHN MARSHALL'S

DEFENSE OF McCulloch

v. Maryland 204, 212-14 (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
70 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1579 n.33. But see 2 W. STORY, LIFE AND LErERs OF
JOSEPH STORY 49 (1851) (reprinting Letter from Joseph Story to Professor Ticknor

(Jan. 27, 1831)). Story's letter states:
If the twenty-fifth section is repealed the Constitution is practically gone
.... Pray read on the subject of the twenty-fifth section, the opinion of
the Supreme Court in Hunter v. Martin .... It contains a full survey of
the judicial power of the General Government and ChiefJustice Marshall
concurred in every word of it.

Id.

71 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1579 n.33.

72 Id. at 1592-93.
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Amar: Huh? Where does he say that? He is obviously invoking
here the analysis and logic of Martin (the Supreme Court opinion
most obviously on point, decided only three years before), which
speaks of congressional obligation. And he invokes the language of
the Constitution, not section 25. In response to Spenser Roane's
slashing constitutional critique of section 25, Marshall could have
simply stressed Congress's power, not its duty. But as did Story in
Martin (with Marshall concurring behind the scenes in "every
word"),75 Marshall explicitly meets Roane with the broad argument
that "shall" and "all" mean what they say even though this argument
was less moderate politically. What's more, two pages before his
explicit invocation of the "all cases" language he says:
[T]he judicial is a co-ordinate department, created at the same
time, and proceeding from the same source, with the legislative
and executive departments .... Neither of these is a deputy of...

the other two.... On ajudicial question, then, the judicial department is the government,
and can alone exercise the judicial power
74
of the United States.
These passages (which again obviously echo Martin) also strongly
support my coextensiveness analysis and show that your "easy" readings of "shall be vested" and "shall extend" are plain misreadings.
And of course nothing here supports your own civil/criminal thesis.
C.

Structure

This is hardly the place to rehearse the interconnected structural
arguments underlying the two-tier thesis-arguments that I at least
consider the thesis's greatest strength-but I do want to dispute
Meltzer's claim that there is "mis-match" between these arguments
and the thesis. First, Meltzer argues that coextensiveness cannot
explain ambassador jurisdiction and notes that it is "striking" that I
spend so little time discussing this category. 75 The reason is simple:
no one today denies that ambassador jurisdiction is obligatory on
Congress, so why spend a lot of time on the obvious? 76 (Except, of
course to note that if ambassador jurisdiction is obligatory, it's only
because "shall" and "all" mean just that.) 7 7 Coextensiveness is an
73 See supra note 70.

Marshall, supra note 69, at 210.
See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1582 n.39, 1614-15.
76 See Amar, supra note 4, at 15l13.
77 See id. at 1524-25. Elsewhere, I have explored the origins of the ambassador
clause in greater detail. See Amar, supra note 3, at 244 n. 129.
74
75
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absolute limit on congressional power-a minimum condition of legitimacy-but hardly the only constitutional limit. When I say "the rule
of law requires that every case arising under federal law, in law,
equity, or admiralty, be within the ultimate jurisdiction of politically
independent courts," I nowhere deny that other principles (e.g.,
respect for ambassadors) might require federal jurisdiction over other
categories.
Meltzer's mis-match claim about how the political safeguards
78 I
principle doesn't cover federal statutes also misses the point.
claim that in tandm,7 9 coextensiveness and political safeguards cover
all "arising under" cases. Any divide-and-conquer attempt to isolate
each one calls to mind the fellow who criticized tea because hot water
is bland and a dry tea bag sticks to one's mouth. Meltzer comes
closer to the mark when he claims that coextensiveness can't account
for the mandatory nature of all admiralty cases.8 0 Elsewhere, I
explain why I think he's wrong here using logic remarkably similar to
what he invokes, when he tries to defend his own civil/criminal thesis. 8 1 In any event, given that the rule of law is a minimal condition of
legitimacy, if no discrimination among admiralty cases is permissible-and article III treats all admiralty as undifferentiated-the category as a whole must be mandatory.
Although Meltzer also tries to create a mis-match between the
structural superiority principle and my overall thesis, mis-match
exists only if we blur together two very different types of state court
"bias," geographic parochialism and political dependence. In fact
these two were quite different. State courts over the years might lose
their localism, but not their lack of article III independence. They
could become no better than article I judges-and for the framers,
that wasn't good enough to satisfy the coextensiveness and political
safeguard principles wherefederal rights were at issue. Coextensive78 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1615. Meltzer also tries to downplay the
qualitative importance of various constitutional limitations on state government
imposed by the original Constitution. See, e.g., id at 1570, 1607 n.134. So too does
Redish. See Redish, supra note 1, at 1645 n.45. For lots of evidence to the contrary,
see Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 3, at 208 n.9, 247 n.134; Amar, Of.
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1440-41 (1987), and sources cited therein.
These sources contain repeated statements by Madison undermining Meltzer's
claims about him. The only other federalist Meltzer cites, Archibald Maclaine, also
viewed federal court review of constitutional limits on states as vital. See 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 54, at 172.
79 Amar, supra note 4, at 1511-13.
80 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1614.
81 See Amar, supra note 4, at 1512-13, 1526-27 & n.85; cf. Meltzer, supra note 2,
at 1576 n.23.
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ness was an axiom 82a rule-of-law condition of legitimacy-and
could not be waived by Congress.
Meltzer also tries to counter the true parity principle by arguing
that the Supreme Court was expected to exercise appellatejurisdiction.1 3 But so were some lower federal courts-over both state and
other federal courts.8 4 Meltzer invokes "uniformity," but nowhere
explains why certain configurations of lower courts-say a National
Tax Court, or a National Court of Appeals-couldn't achieve uniformity. Meltzer closes this section with a question: "Is there... a
coherent basis for concluding, as Amar does, that article III does
protect the supremacy of federal law (vis-a-vis the states and the federal political branches), but does not require uniformity?",8 5 Sure
there is-especially if we stop focussing on (at most) microscopic
holes in section 25, and instead look at the basic structure of the First
Judiciary Act. No claims of federal right were given finally to state
courts under section 25 (even under Meltzer's narrow reading of this
section), but lower federal courts were allowed the last word in lots
of critical federal cases-even at the expense of uniformity. For
example, because of "exceptions" made in favor of lower federal
courts, only these courts, and not the Supreme Court, ruled on the
Alien and Sedition Acts during the new nation's first constitutional
crisis.
In the end, despite Meltzer's best efforts, all my structural arguments remain intact, and firmly linked to my overall two-tier thesis.

III. THE VERDICT
My separation of the data into separate categories-text, history,
structure, etc.-eases exposition but risks obscuring the rich inter82 See e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ("If
there be such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a
government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the
number."). For similar language of "natural," immutable, math-like laws of political
'science" that the federalist children of the Enlightenment believed that they had
discovered, see sources cited in Amar, supra note 4, at 1563-64 (describing coextensiveness as Platonic "essen[ce]" required by mathematical requirement of

"indivisibility," and the "very Nature of the Thing," the violation of which is a
"Solecism"). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 1 supra, at 51 (A. Hamilton) (invoking
"science of politics"); id. No. 31, at 193-94 (A. Hamilton) (certain principles of
government analogized to "maxims in geometry").
83 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1618-19. For further answers to Meltzer's
uniformity question, see Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 3, at 220 & n.59, 263
& n.189; Clinton, supra note 19, at '753, 778, 832.
84 See, e.g., Amar, A Neo-Federahst View, supra note 3, at 234.
85 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1619.
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connections and synergies across categories. (For example,
although the strongest arguments for bifurcation are structural, my
exposition may seem to put more weight on the textual basis.) In my
1985 essay, I sought to illustrate these interconnections by presenting a detailed, integrated and coherent narrative. I do not believe
I'm the only one who has done so. Professors Clinton and (to a
somewhat lesser degree) Sager have in their own work presented
86
similarly careful and holistic accounts.
Although we disagree among ourselves about certain issues,
what binds us all together is our strong rejection of the "traditional"
account that both Redish and Meltzer seek to defend. As I have
shown in this rejoinder, neither "traditionalist" presents a careful
and integrated counternarrative of the "traditional" position that
comes within miles of the required level of coherence and plausibility. Meltzer contents himself with "easy," answers that are anything
but, and Redish rewrites the text and refuses to seriously engage history, structure, and case law. In fairness to them, it must be noted
that they were asked to respond to my ideas, not affirmatively set out
their own from start to finish. But given that I have always explicitly
framed the issue as a comparative question, their expositions fall far
short.
The biggest problem is that nowhere else is the "traditional"
account set forth and defended with rigor. Redish's comment cites
his earlier work, but there is very little careful history here, and obviously no engagement of subsequent and more comprehensive
accounts that Clinton and I have offered.8 7 So too, Meltzer, in
86 See Amar, supra note 4, at 1506 n.18 (citing sources). Professor David
Engdahl's comprehensive but largely unpublished work, which came to hand as the
present essay was in press, also merits mention. Engdahl powerfully critiques the
"traditional" account along lines that, in general, strongly support the two-tier
thesis.
87 Nor does Redish's current comment improve matters. His citation of John
Rutledge's remarks at Philadelphia actually undercuts his argument, a§ he indeed
acknowledges. See Redish supra note 1, at 1646 n.49, and his only other historical
arguments consist of wildly conclusory nonsequiturs concerning the Madisonian
Compromise and the convention's decision to abandon a congressional negative in
favor of a judicially enforceable supremacy clause. These issues are painstakingly
addressed in both Clinton's work and my own, and Redish's treatment simply fails to
address our arguments and evidence.
Redish also argues that although he and I both understand that federal-state
judicial parity is a myth, perhaps the framers didn't. See id. at 1644. The evidence
Clinton and I present shows otherwise, and Redish neither engages this evidence nor
presents contrary historical evidence. Professor Redish shows good structural
intuition in seeing parity as a myth, but on this issue he is no smarter than the
federalist framers themselves.
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explaining why he finds the "Tradition" more plausible, string cites
three sources. Meltzer seems to view these sources as so decisive as
to obviate the need for him to rehearse their arguments in detail and
thereby demonstrate their comparative advantage.8 8 The first
source is a one-page statement (citing next to nothing) from a 1965
lecture delivered by Professor Wechsler. 89 The second source, a
twelve page pre-Clinton-and-Amar symposium essay by Paul Bator,
not only cites virtually no eighteenth or early nineteenth century
sources in support of the "Tradition," but in fact identifies some of
the major historical defects in the "traditional" account:
The "states rights" argument at the Constitutional Convention was that there was no need for lower federal courts precisely
because the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would
provide sufficient assurance of the supremacy and uniformity of
federal law in cases decided by the state courts. It was the premise
of this argument that the Supreme Court would have the power to
review cases originating in the state courts concerning issues of
federal law. It was plainly not contemplated that the system could
work effectively with9 0the state courts as courts of last resort on
issues of federal law.
Meltzer's final citation is to a 1984 essay by Professor Gerald Gunther.9" But as Meltzer himself notes elsewhere, 92 Gunther's 1989
public statements are rather encouraging of the two-tier approach.
Although Meltzer also cites private correspondence implying that
there may be even more recent backsliding on Gunther's part,9 3 I
take this correspondence to be a tribute to the artfulness with which
Meltzer has packaged his skepticism of the two-tier thesis.94
88 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1624. Although Meltzer implies that space
constraints preclude adequate presentation of the "traditional" account, id., I think
the problem lies elsewhere. To my mind Meltzer would have been more persuasive
had he spent less space on irrelevancies and moleholes-e.g., unimportant drafts
from Philadelphia, the wrinkle of § 25, and implications for parity beyond the
jurisdiction-stripping debate-and more time pondering central elements of the twotier thesis like items * 1-*4, and the generally mandatory nature of "shall."
89 Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 1001, 1005
(1965).
90 Bator, CongrgressionalPower over theJurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 1030, 1038-39 (1982).
91 Gunther, Congressional Power to CurtailJurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1984).
92 See Meltzer, supra note 2, at 1569 n.2.
93 See id.
94 Indeed, I must confess that when I first read Meltzer's essay in draft, I too,
began to doubt the two-tier thesis. But the more I examine Meltzer's presentation,
the less doubtful I become on the key comparative question.
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In the end, hope springs eternal. I hope that I have shown that
many of Meltzer and Redish's criticisms are exaggerated and that
their affirmative arguments on behalf of their "Tradition" are woefully thin. I hope that when Professor Gunther reads this rejoinder
he will once again see the light. Finally, I hope, dear reader, that you
will accept the invitation of all of the essays in this volume to
examine the evidence and arguments firsthand, and judge for yourself. And when you do, I hope that you, too, will see that the two-tier
thesis plainly provides the most satisfying account of article III.

